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We find a U-shaped relation between happiness and religiosity in cross-country panel data 
after controlling for income levels. At a given level of income, the same level of happiness 
can be reached with high and low levels of religiosity, but not with intermediate levels. A rise 
in income causes an increase in happiness along with a decline of religiosity. Our 
interpretation of the empirical results is that the indifference curves for religiosity and other 
commodities of the utility function are hump-shaped. 
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Germany. E-mail: opfinger@vwl.uni-hannover.de. 1.  Empirical happiness research, religiosity, and utility theory 
Since its beginning, empirical research on happiness has been at odds with basic utility 
theory. Rich people generally report higher levels of happiness than poor people, but rising 
average incomes do not increase happiness beyond a satiation point according to the Easterlin 
paradox (Easterlin 1973, 1974, 1995). Hence, an increase in income beyond the satiation point 
only seems to shift the reference point within a society, without affecting utility as proxied by 
a measure of happiness. This contradicts textbook utility theory, where changes in income 
always shift the indifference curve to a higher level of utility. 
Taken at face value, the Easterlin paradox has far-reaching policy implications. If 
rising incomes only shift the reference point instead of improving utility, a primary goal of 
government policy should be higher taxes on income or consumption rather than a focus on 
economic growth (Layard 2003). This conjecture has led to two related theoretical reactions. 
Frey and Stutzer (2006) appeal to mistakes in decision making in cases where utility and 
subjective levels of happiness do not correspond. For instance, accepting a better paid job 
should not reduce happiness because the higher income should at least compensate for any 
related inconveniences. But Stutzer and Frey (2008) find that people who accept a better paid 
job with higher commuting costs report less happiness. So this line of reasoning presumes that 
utility deviates from subjective happiness because individuals might make mistakes when 
maximizing their utility. 
Criticizing the assumption that individuals systematically fail to maximize their utility, 
Becker and Rayo (2008) argue that measures of happiness and the reported Easterlin paradox 
might not have a clear foundation in utility theory at all. They consider subjective happiness 
as an argument of the utility function rather than as a direct proxy for utility itself. According 
to their approach, utility would remain in the realm of the empirically unknown. This way the 
Easterlin paradox would no longer remain at odds with basic utility theory since a decline of 
happiness with rising income could be interpreted as a substitution effect. 
However, there is probably no longer any need to rationalize the Easterlin paradox. 
New empirical results based on improved international data sets suggest that the Easterlin 
paradox can be put to rest. Deaton (2008), Stevenson and Wolfers (2008), and Sacks et al. 
(2010) provide strong evidence for a robust positive link between aggregate indicators of 
happiness and log per capita income across countries and over time. Moreover, the estimated 
effects of income on happiness closely resemble the well-known within-country correlation 
between individual levels of happiness and individual income.   2
The new empirical evidence allows for a fresh start on the empirics of well-being. We 
consider happiness as a direct proxy of utility, as implicitly claimed in the empirical 
happiness literature (Frey and Stutzer, 2002). That is, our textbook utility function implies 
that income should be positively correlated with measures of happiness. The next natural step 
is to look for plausible arguments of such a utility function. Religiosity appears to be one of 
them. 
The present major religions are several centuries or even millennia old. Since their 
origins, the world has changed along many cultural and social dimensions. Beginning with the 
Enlightenment, the churches as the main institutional manifestations of religion have lost their 
strong influence on people's daily decision making in many countries. Due to an ever growing 
stock of scientific knowledge since the onset of the Industrial Revolution, mankind has 
learned that natural disasters have other sources than the fury of the Gods. But this cannot 
belie the fact that many people still believe in their Gods, go to church, and pray. 
Hence, religiosity or religious behavior obviously creates utility, together with other 
commodities of the utility function. Below we return to the question which other commodities 
could be part of the utility function. For the moment we hypothesize that religiosity could be 
either a complement or a substitute for the other commodities, and it may turn out to be a 
normal or an inferior good. To complicate matters, these potential properties may actually 
differ across religious subgroups within major branches, such as within Christianity, where 
the Protestant work ethic (Weber 1904/05) and the more joyful way of life encouraged by 
Catholic norms come to mind. We circumvent such problems by relying on aggregated self-
reported measures of religiosity that are largely independent of the specific religious 
denomination of the respondents. 
We begin by considering the empirical relation between subjective happiness and 
religiosity conditional on the level of income. Such a conditional relation should be present in 
the data if religiosity is an argument of the utility function and if utility can be satisfyingly 
proxied by measures of happiness.  
Earlier empirical research on the link between religiosity and subjective well-being 
starts with Ellison (1991), who finds a positive correlation. Robbins and Francis (1996) report 
a positive relationship between religiosity and happiness in a study among undergraduate 
students. Peacock and Poloma (1999) suggest that religiosity increases with age and as such 
tends to increase reported well-being. Along these lines, Greene and Yoon (2004) assert that 
subjective well-being rises with religious attachment as measured by the willingness to attend 
religious services regularly.   3
Ferriss (2002) confirms a positive correlation between happiness and the frequency of 
church attendance but points to denominational and doctrinal differences across churches. 
Lelkes (2006) uses the economic transition in Hungary after the collapse of socialism as an 
exogenous shock and corroborates that higher religiosity, measured in terms of church 
attendance, is positively correlated with reported well-being. Elliott and Hayward (2009) 
maintain that tighter government regulation is positively correlated with personal religiosity 
and life satisfaction, and negatively correlated with participation in social religious activities. 
Focusing on life satisfaction instead of happiness, Okulicz-Kozaryn (2010) finds a 
bimodal relation between religiosity and subjective well-being. It appears that religious 
people in general tend to be either very satisfied or dissatisfied and that they are happier in 
religious than in non-religious countries. This result shows that the effect of religiosity on 
subjective well-being may depend on the social context and might not be linear.  
Taken at face value, a positive relation between religiosity and happiness as reported 
in some empirical studies is puzzling if two other empirical results are taken into account. 
Happiness is positively correlated with the level of income (Deaton 2008, Stevenson and 
Wolfers 2008, Sacks et al. 2010), and religiosity is negatively correlated with the level of 
income (McCleary and Barro 2006, Paldam and Gundlach 2010). Hence, one would expect to 
find a negative and not a positive correlation between religiosity and happiness without 
controlling for income. 
Furthermore, a positive correlation between religiosity and happiness conditional on 
income does not necessarily pick up the effect of religiosity on happiness if there are other 
inputs into the utility function that may be correlated with religiosity but are not accounted 
for. That is, a robust estimate would have to control for a potential omitted variables bias. On 
top of this, the result reported by Okulicz-Kozaryn (2010) suggests that an empirical 
specification should allow for a non-linear relation between religiosity and happiness.  
To the best of our knowledge, the hypothesis of a non-linear relation between 
happiness and religiosity has not been further discussed in the literature. The only other 
related study we are aware of is based on household survey data for a sample of Tibetan 
herders. Tu et al. (2011) report an inverted U-shaped relation between religious ‘inputs’ (time 
and money spent in the temple) and income. Though the great majority of the respondents 
appears to be on the upward sloping part of the curve linking economic performance to 
religious inputs, some respondents appear to use too many resources as religious inputs 
relative to the economic performance achieved. Given that economic performance is a good   4
proxy for happiness, these findings would imply that the same level of happiness (economic 
performance) can be achieved with high and low levels of religious inputs.  
We explore the possibility of an aggregate non-linearity between religiosity and 
happiness at the level of countries, and propose an interpretation of such a non-linear relation 
in terms of a textbook utility model. Our hypothesis is that conditional on the level of income, 
a given level of happiness may be attainable with low or high levels of religiosity, but not 
with intermediate levels. This reasoning implies a hump-shaped indifference curve with 
religiosity as one of the commodities of the utility function. In addition, we hypothesize that 
religiosity is substituted for other commodities of the utility function when the level of 
income rises. 
Section 2 describes the data and our empirical specification. In Section 3 we discuss 
our main empirical result on the relation between happiness and religiosity and consider its 
robustness conditional on a number of alternative controls and estimation methods. Section 4 
provides an assessment of our empirical results and an interpretation in terms of long-run 
development. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.  Data and empirical specification 
Our measure of happiness is taken from the study by Stevenson and Wolfers (2008). Their 
measure is calculated from data provided by the World Values Survey (WVS). The WVS is 
based on surveys that have been conducted in many developing and industrialized countries in 
several waves. The survey questionnaire includes information about the respondents' 
demographics, such as age and gender, as well as the economic circumstances of the 
household. The data used in Stevenson and Wolfers (2008) span the four waves 1982, 1990, 
1995, and 2000. 
The WVS questions concerning happiness are asked in the following way: "Taking all 
things together, would you say you are: very happy; quite happy; not very happy; not at all 
happy?" Stevenson and Wolfers (2008) create a measure of average national happiness and 
from the sample data by running an ordered probit regressions on country fixed effects.
3 We 
                                                 
3. The WVS also includes a measure of life satisfaction. In parts of the literature, well-being, happiness, and life 
satisfaction have been used synonymously. But there may be differences between the concepts, notwithstanding 
a statistically significant correlation between the measures of happiness and life satisfaction. A possible 
discrepancy could be the time horizon that is considered when respondents answer questions about happiness 
and life satisfaction. Happiness is probably a more short-term measure of personal well-being, whereas life 
satisfaction takes into account a long-term perspective. In this paper, we focus on happiness as the dependent 
variable and report results for life satisfaction only when considering the robustness of our main result.   5
use their approach to generate an augmented sample that includes the 2005 WVS wave.
4 This 
unbalanced panel of happiness data with the aggregated individual information from the five 
WVS waves includes 93 countries, with 11 countries participating in all five waves and 32 
countries participating in at least three of the five waves.
5  
The ordered probit index of happiness is our dependent variable, i.e., our proxy of 
average national utility. This index of happiness is distributed mainly between -1 and 1. The 
lowest value of the happiness index is reported by Albania in 1995 (-1.142), the highest by 
Nigeria in the year 2000 (0.9982).  
Our measure of average national religiosity is taken from Paldam and Gundlach 
(2010). The religiosity score (religiosity) is based on answers to questions from the same 
waves of the WVS that have been used to construct the happiness index. Paldam and 
Gundlach (2010) use factor analysis to identify a robust average measure of religiosity that is 
based on answers to 14 items that are directly related to religious behavior, such as whether 
respondents frequently attend religious services, believe in God, or think that religion is 
important in life and faith is important in teaching children. This measure is held to identify 
the importance of religion in all aspects of people's lives. We divide the reported religiosity 
score by 100 to avoid four-digit regression coefficients, such that the rescaled religiosity score 
ranges from 0.02 points in China in 1990 to 0.91 points in Nigeria in 1995. 
The income data come from the Maddison homepage (Maddison 2010), where income 
is measured as Gross Domestic Product per person in constant international prices (ln gdpc). 
For countries that are included in the WVS but not in the Maddison data, we rely on income 
data from CIA World Factbook. In our sample, per capita income in constant prices ranges 
from 686 dollars for Ethiopia in 2005 to 43,900 dollars for Luxembourg in 2000. 
A number of control variables are included as potential additional determinants of 
happiness, i.e. as potential arguments of the utility function. Measures of political rights and 
civil liberties are taken from Freedom House and rescaled in a way that the highest value of 7 
relates to a situation with the highest degree of political rights and civil liberties, respectively. 
The degree of democracy as measured by the polity score is taken from the Polity IV dataset. 
Data on the marriage rate come from the United Nations Statistics Division, from the United 
Nations Statistical Yearbook and from the World Consumer Lifestyles Databook. Information 
on life expectancy at birth, the rate of (log) inflation, and the unemployment rate are taken 
                                                 
4. We have been able to reproduce the Stevenson-Wolfers happiness data for the first four WVS waves up to 
minor differences in the range of second decimal points. 
5. We drop Tanzania (one observation for the year 2000) from our sample because of inconsistent data on 
happiness and life satisfaction.   6
from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank. Detailed definitions and sources 
for all variables that are used in our empirical analyses are reported in the appendix (Table 
A1). 
We are mainly interested in the empirical relation between happiness and religiosity. 
Our dependent and independent variables are measured across countries i at times t. In our 
most general specification, our measure of happiness  is regressed on religiosity and on 
squared religiosity to allow for a non-linear relation, on log per capita income (ln it gdpc ), and 




12 3 4 ln it it it it i t it it happiness c religiosity religiosity gdpc X =+ + + + + + + β ββ β α α ε  , 
 
where  1 β  and  2 β  are the main coefficients of interest, Xit is a vector of control variables that 
are expected to affect the level of happiness along with religiosity and income,  i α  and  t α  are 
country-fixed and time-fixed effects, and  it ε  is an error term. 
We begin with a benchmark specification of equation (1) that keeps (linear) religiosity 
and income as the only explanatory variables and uses all available data points. We also check 
whether religiosity can be considered a threshold variable, which would motivate a non-linear 
specification of religiosity. The robustness of our results for the non-linear religiosity 
specification is subsequently tested by including alternative control variables and using 
different estimation methods. 
 
3. Estimation results 
Our basic results for the benchmark estimation are reported in Table 1. The first column 
shows that income and religiosity have statistically significant positive effects on happiness. 
An increase in income by one logarithmic point is predicted to raise the happiness index by 
0.3 points. This income effect is in line with the effect on happiness reported by Stevenson 
und Wolfers (2008), who do not control for religiosity. 
The income effect is large. The total variation in our measure of happiness between 
the 25
th and the 75
th percentile is about 0.64 index points. The difference in income between 
25
th and the 75
th percentile of our sample is about 1.45 logarithmic points. Hence with this 
specification, about 70 percent of the variation in happiness between the 25
th and the 75
th 
percentile can be statistically explained by differences in income (0.31*1.45/0.64=0.70).   7
The coefficient estimate for religiosity is also statistically significant and 
quantitatively important. An increase in the religiosity score by 10 percentage points is 
predicted to raise the happiness index by 0.1 points.
6 Thus, higher religiosity seems to 
increase happiness, independent of the level of income. 
However, such an interpretation excludes the possibility that the same level of well-
being can be reached with low and high levels of religiosity, as suggested by Okulicz-
Kozaryn (2010) and indirectly implied by the results of Tu et al. (2011). To test for a possible 
bimodal distribution of religiosity at the country level, we employ the threshold regression 
test proposed by Hansen (2000), with religiosity as the threshold variable.
7 
The reported results have been derived by employing the heteroskedasticity-consistent 
Lagrange multiplier test for a threshold. The p-value for the LM test is below the one percent 
level of statistical significance. The threshold value occurs at a religiosity score of 54 percent 
with an asymptotic 95 percent confidence interval of 12 percentage points. It turns out that the 
religiosity threshold variable splits the sample into two equally-sized subsamples: a low-
religiosity subsample with 117 observations and a high-religiosity subsample with 117 
observations. For the high-religiosity subsample, the effect of religiosity on happiness 
remains positive as in column (1), but for the low-religiosity subsample, there is a negative 
though statistically insignificant effect. 
This result points to a non-linear effect of religiosity on happiness. The threshold 
regression approach identifies an abrupt regime change within a rather narrow interval of the 
religiosity score. To allow for a more gradual regime change, the specification in column (2) 
of Table 1 includes religiosity squared as an additional explanatory variable. Given the results 
of the threshold regression test, we would expect to find a negative coefficient on the linear 
religiosity term and a positive coefficient on the squared religiosity term.  
The results in column (2) are as expected. The coefficient on the linear religiosity term 
is negative and the coefficient on the squared religiosity term is positive. Both coefficients are 
statistically significant at the one percent level. The coefficient on income remains more or 
less unchanged and statistically significant. These estimates point to a U-shaped relation 
between happiness and religiosity, conditional on the level of income. 
The next three columns of Table 1 display the results for alternative estimators. The 
U-shaped religiosity effect and the income effect also show up for a between-estimate (an 
                                                 
6. For the regression analysis we have rescaled the religiosity score. The coefficient used for the calculation of 
the effect of religiosity on happiness is 0.0101. 
7. We are grateful to Bernd Lucke for running all threshold regression tests reported in the paper.   8
average of the cross-sections) in the third column, but the negative linear religiosity effect is 
no longer statistically significantly different from zero. The statistical significance returns for 
a within-estimate (with country-fixed effects) in the fourth column, where the hypothesis of a 
joint significance of the country dummies cannot be rejected. 
The between- and the within-effects appear to be rather similar in size for each of the 
two religiosity terms and the income variable. Therefore, we employ the random-effects 
estimator in column (5). Since the random-effects estimator is a weighted average of the 
between- and the fixed-effects estimators, the RE results are necessarily much in line with the 
other estimates, but the question is whether the random effects estimator can be considered as 
efficient. 
According to the Hausman test statistic, it seems that a random effects model cannot 
be rejected relative to a fixed effects model at conventional levels of statistical significance. 
However, it turns out that the difference between the estimated covariance matrices is not 
positive definite, so the Hausman test is not defined and cannot be applied. 
Following Gould (2001), we use a coefficient test to check the efficiency of the 
random-effects estimator. The first step is to decompose each explanatory variable into a 
mean value (across countries) and a difference from the mean. Then a regression of the 
dependent variable on this set of explanatory variables produces the coefficients on the 
averaged and the demeaned variables that would be estimated separately by between-effects 
and by fixed-effects regressions. If it turns out that the coefficients on the averaged and the 
demeaned variables are not statistically significantly different, the random effects estimator 
can be considered as efficient. 
The results in Table 1 show that the hypothesis of equal coefficients estimated with 
fixed- and between-effects cannot be rejected for each explanatory variable individually. The 
hypothesis of equal fixed- and between-effects coefficients also cannot be rejected if the three 
explanatory variables are considered jointly. We use these test results to proceed with the 
random effects estimator. 
In the next step we test whether the U-shaped relationship between happiness and 
religiosity also holds if other variables are taken into account that may have an independent 
effect on happiness. For instance, Frey and Stutzer (2002) see a role for political factors in the 
explanation of well-being. Easterlin (1973, 2001) argues that well-being is influenced by 
personal and family matters, by health, and by economic factors other than average income, 
such as inflation and unemployment. The empirical problem is that most potential control   9
variables will be correlated with income, which makes it difficult to identify their independent 
effect on happiness. 
Our general finding from including further control variables is that the U-shaped 
relation between happiness and religiosity remains intact. Table 2 reports random effects 
estimation results for the inclusion of civil liberties, political rights, democracy, the marriage 
rate, life expectancy at birth, the log inflation rate, and the unemployment rate. Some of the 
additional control variables are statistically significant and have the expected sign (except for 
the marriage rate), but their inclusion leaves unchanged the effects of religiosity and income. 
This finding appears to reduce the probability that an omitted variables bias is driving the 
estimated U-shaped relation between happiness and religiosity. 
The test results show that a random effects model cannot be rejected for most 
specifications. The Hausman test would reject a random effects model only for column (7), 
but it turns out that the Hausman test cannot be applied in any specification because its 
underlying assumptions are not satisfied. The alternative coefficient test (Gould, 2001) 
suggests, with one exception, that the fixed-effects coefficients and the between-effects 
coefficients of all of the individual regressors are not different from each other at the five 
percent level of statistical significance. The joint equality of the between-effects and the 
fixed-effects coefficients also cannot be rejected, except for columns (4) and (7). Overall, 
these results provide rather strong support for estimation with a random effects model. 
Column (1) in Table 3 uses two aggregate measures of the previously considered 
control variables to see if their simultaneous inclusion has an effect on the estimates of 
religiosity and income. The average of civil liberties and political rights is called the 
participation index, and the average of the inflation rate and the unemployment rate called the 
misery index. Both aggregated variables enter in a statistically significant way, but the effects 
of religiosity and income on happiness remain unchanged by their inclusion. 
The test results again reveal that the Hausman test cannot be applied. As before, the 
coefficient test cannot reject a random effects model in favor of a fixed-effects model. 
Column (2) provides the fixed-effects results to allow for a direct quantitative comparison of 
the estimated coefficients. The FE-coefficients are similar in magnitude and in levels of 
statistical significance to the RE-coefficients, as implied by the results of the coefficient test 
in column (1). 
The inclusion of the lagged endogenous variable is another possibility to check the 
robustness of our estimates. For instance, one could speculate that there is an inverse relation 
from happiness to religiosity, such that religiosity is in fact a U-shaped function of happiness   10
and not the other way round as in our previous specifications. If so, our significant religiosity 
estimate may actually identify the effect of the missing lagged happiness variable. Column (3) 
shows that the coefficient of lagged happiness is indeed large and highly statistically 
significant, but the estimated coefficients on the two religiosity terms and on income are not 
much affected. Controlling for country-fixed effects in column (4) eliminates the relevance of 
the lagged endogenous variable and reduces the statistical significance of the religiosity 
estimates to the 10 percent level, but the size of the estimated religiosity effects on happiness 
remains largely unchanged. As an interesting side result, the hypothesis of a joint significance 
of the country dummies is rejected for this specification.  
Our results may also be sensitive to the inclusion of extreme observations on 
religiosity. Relative to their income level, China and the United States have religiosity scores 
that can be considered as outliers for most WVS waves (Paldam and Gundlach 2010). In 
column (5), we include a dummy that equals 1 for China and zero otherwise. The China 
dummy enters twice, as a level dummy and as a slope dummy that is interacted with the linear 
religiosity variable. This specification reveals that the low conditional religiosity scores of 
China affect the estimated coefficient on the linear religiosity variable. In the dummy 
specification, the coefficient is substantially reduced in size and statistically significant only at 
the eight percent level). But the negative sign remains, and the estimated coefficient is still 
within the 95 percent confidence interval of all the negative coefficients in Tables 1, 2, and 3.
8 
In column (6), the slope dummy for the United States has been interacted with the squared 
religiosity variable in order to allow for a possible effect of the exceptionally high conditional 
US religiosity scores. In this case there seems to be no quantitative impact on the estimated 
U-shaped effects of religiosity on happiness. 
As a final robustness check, we consider a measure of life satisfaction as an alternative 
dependent variable, i.e., as an alternative proxy of utility. Table A2 repeats some of the 
specifications discussed in Tables 1 and 3. The general impression is that the estimates are 
less robust than with happiness as the dependent variable, but a conditional U-shaped relation 
also emerges for life satisfaction and religiosity. 
With the OLS estimator in column (1), the religiosity terms have the signs and the 
sizes familiar from Tables 1-3, but the linear religiosity term is only statistically significant at 
                                                 
8 In addition, it is not self evident that the low conditional religiosity scores of China should be considered as 
biased, say, due to repressive measures by the government. The religiosity score of Hong Kong in 2005 is in the 
same range, but cannot be explained away by repressive government measures. This is not to deny that further 
research may be necessary to understand the exceptionally low Chinese religiosity scores, and probably also the 
exceptionally high conditional religiosity scores of the United States. 
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the eight percent level. The RE estimator in column (2) produces a marginally significant 
(five percent level) linear religiosity coefficient. The coefficient test shows that the RE 
estimator cannot be considered as efficient, mainly because the estimated FE- and BE-
coefficients of income are statistically different from each other. However, the estimated FE- 
and BE-coefficients of the two religiosity terms are not statistically different from each other. 
Columns (3) and (4) repeat specifications with the additional controls participation 
and misery. The FE results are statistically insignificant, which is probably due to the high 
within-multicollinearity of the explanatory variables. But even these estimates reflect the 
same pattern as the statistically significant estimates in column (4) of Table 3. The RE results 
are like the RE results in column (2) and thus show that the additional controls do not affect 
the religiosity coefficients. The linear religiosity coefficient is statistically significant at the 
six percent level, and the coefficient test suggests that the religiosity coefficients are 
efficiently estimated. 
The last column shows that that the religiosity observations for China have a strong 
effect on the estimated coefficients if life satisfaction is used as the dependent variable. The 
two China dummies reach marginal levels of statistical significance (12 percent and six 
percent, respectively), and the coefficients of the two religiosity terms become smaller and 
statistically insignificant. 
Overall, our results could suffer from some shortcomings. One qualification is that we 
solely rely on happiness and religiosity data from the World Values Survey, and that these 
data may include some rather extreme observations, especially on religiosity as shown by the 
inclusion of the China dummies. Other data sources might lead to different results. However, 
the results in Stevenson and Wolfers (2008) on the effect of income on happiness did not 
depend on the data source, so maybe this holds for alternative measures of religiosity as well. 
Another qualification is that we have only used a very limited set of proxy variables for 
family matters and health, which may also determine the level of happiness. But the 
robustness of our results indicates that the effect of further control variables may turn out to 
be limited. 
Taken together, we find an average linear religiosity coefficient of -1.75 and an 
average squared religiosity coefficient of 2.31 with the preferred random effects estimation 
with additional controls (Table 3, column 3). In the initial sample of 234 observations, the 
difference between the 25
th and the 75
th percentile in both the linear and the squared 
religiosity score is about 0.3 points (0.32 points vs. 0.35 points). Hence with specification (3) 
of Table 3, the estimated net effect of religiosity explains about 39 percent of the variation in   12
happiness between the 25
th and the 75
th percentile, and the estimated income effect here 
explains 53 percent of the variation. 
The linear and the squared coefficient estimates also predict the level of religiosity that 
minimizes the level of happiness, conditional on income and other potential control variables. 
Using the same religiosity coefficients as before, happiness is minimized at a religiosity score 
of 38 percentage points. Since our measure of religiosity mainly ranges between 90 and 20 
percentage points, the maximum loss of well-being appears to be caused by a relatively large 
decline in religiosity away from the level typical for traditional societies towards a level more 
typical of modern societies. 
Our results are in line with textbook utility theory in so far as income would shift the 
utility function, which is proxied by our measure of happiness, and religiosity together with 
participation and the absence of misery would appear as commodities of the utility function. 
However, a U-shaped relation between happiness and religiosity does not fit into the textbook 
utility model. In the next section we review some arguments in favor of a non-linear relation 
between happiness and religiosity, and consider how this relation can be interpreted from the 
perspective of a simple utility model. 
 
4. Discussion 
Our stylized empirical result implies that all else constant, people are happier in countries in 
which the level of religiosity is either high or low, but are less happy in countries with 
intermediate levels of religiosity. One possible explanation for this observation is that people 
may be less happy when the population is highly heterogeneous in terms of cultural attitudes 
and social norms. 
For instance, a very religious person in a country in which the average level of 
religiosity is rather low may feel unhappy because the rest of the population follows a 
distinctly different way of life. This could be associated with a feeling of a loss of values, 
independent of the actual religious denomination. A frequent churchgoer, for example, could 
be unhappy even though he attends mass every Sunday if he realizes that only very few of his 
neighbors join him. An atheistic person may feel unhappy if he lives in a very religious 
country, even more so if the secular part of life is influenced by religious affairs such that, 
say, shops are closed on Sundays, there is no public transportation on Sabbath, and restaurants 
are closed during daytime in Ramadan.   13
Apparently, well-being is difficult to achieve without being part of a community in 
which people share similar attitudes and beliefs, and identify with the same moral values. This 
can be illustrated by simple network effects. A large network is more effective than a small 
network. If an atheistic person realizes that nobody else practices religious ceremonies and if 
a very religious person realizes that everybody else enjoys praying or working for the 
religious community, both networks could be a source of happiness and life satisfaction.
9 But 
in societies without such networks or in societies with alternative networks for atheists and 
religious believers, the result could be distrust or even rivalry between the different networks 
because the formation of a common identity of the two groups is not possible. Such an 
outcome could be a source of less happiness and life satisfaction on average, especially in the 
absence of long-run income growth for all groups. 
Another factor which may explain the conditional U-shaped relationship is that 
countries with intermediate levels of religiosity are typically countries with medium levels of 
income. Paldam and Gundlach (2010) argue that secularization in the form of a religious 
transition is part of the long-run process of economic development. This process generates 
fundamental changes in almost all matters of life and all fields of society. For instance, people 
may have to move from rural to urban homes, from labor-intensive to skill-intensive jobs, 
from high to low fertility and from low to high female labor supply, and also from 
experiencing the sometimes rocky path from non-democratic to democratic forms of 
government. All these changes are likely to contribute to an initial feeling of insecurity, and 
consequently to less personal happiness and life satisfaction. Not surprisingly, some social 
groups correctly believe that they have been better off before the transition process started. 
But after the transition has been completed and a low level of religiosity is reached, the 
average level of subjective well-being may be high again due to a possible substitution of 
religiosity for other commodities of the utility function. 
So in our view, network effects and transition effects can be considered as 
determinants of the U-shaped relationship between happiness and religiosity. People should 
be happier when they feel they belong to a social group. If this group identification is not 
possible or if there is rivalry between religious and non-religious networks, less happiness is 
likely to prevail. And people are likely to be less happy when being confronted with ongoing 
fundamental socio-economic transitions. Hence the presence of stable social networks and the 
                                                 
9. A steep upward sloping part of a U-shaped relation between happiness and religiosity illustrates that religious 
people could have relatively high or relatively low levels of well-being, as reported by (Okulicz-Kozaryn 2010). 
The same may hold for non-religious people, as implied by a steep downward sloping part of the same U-shaped 
relation.   14
absence of large transition effects may explain why countries with very high and countries 
with very low levels of religiosity report higher subjective happiness than countries that are 
stuck in between. 
What remains to be puzzling is how the hypothesis of a U-shaped relation between 
happiness and religiosity can be interpreted within a standard indifference curve diagram. The 
problem is that a convex indifference curve would not allow for such a U-shaped relation – 
which implies that the indifference curve cannot be convex if our empirical results hold. 
In Figure 1, happiness is used as a proxy of utility, which is represented by an 
indifference curve. A higher income shifts the indifference curve to the north-east, implying a 
higher level of happiness. Religiosity is held to be one of the consumption goods that 
determine happiness; participation and the absence of misery are proposed to be other 
consumption goods that determine happiness, as reported in Table 3.  
The level of happiness (utility) is constant along a given indifference curve. Our 
regression results imply that happiness falls with declining religiosity until the minimum is 
reached at a religiosity score slightly below 40 percent, and rises thereafter with further 
declining religiosity. Hence, moving along a given indifference curve from right to left, 
happiness will remain constant if falling religiosity consumption is compensated for by rising 
consumption of the other determinants of happiness. But this standard pattern of substitution 
only holds as long as the positive (squared) religiosity effect determines the outcome on 
happiness. Once the minimum of the happiness-religiosity relation has been reached, less 
religiosity consumption would increase the level of happiness. To keep utility (happiness) 
constant,  falling consumption of the other determinants of happiness is required if the 
consumption of religiosity falls beyond the level corresponding to the estimated happiness 
minimum. Therefore, our finding of a U-shaped relation between happiness and religiosity 
implies a hump-shaped indifference curve, where the hump of the indifference curve occurs at 
the minimum of the U-shaped happiness-religiosity relation. 
With a hump-shaped indifference curve, we get the same level of happiness for low 
and for high levels of religiosity, conditional on the level of income and conditional on the 
level of other determinants of happiness. This result would reappear for all levels of income, 
i.e. for hump-shaped indifference curves that represent different levels of happiness such as 
the two curves in Figure 1. As these indifference curves are drawn, an increase in income 
would result in a decline of religiosity for constant relative prices. 
The implication of Figure 1 is that there are two extreme equilibria at the intersection 
of the indifference curves with the axes, which become visible once a budget constraint is   15
included. It is tempting to conclude that these are the equilibria that are reached before and 
after the religious transition from a traditional to a modern level. For instance, a shift from the 
traditional high religiosity equilibrium to the modern low religiosity equilibrium would be 
reached in Figure 1 if the slope of the budget constraint would rise with rising levels of 
income. However, more research is necessary to show that persistent changes in the relative 
price of religiosity can explain the observed religious transition. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Our basic result is a conditional U-shaped relation between happiness and religiosity. 
Countries with high levels of religiosity and countries with low levels of religiosity report 
higher levels of well-being than countries with medium levels of religiosity, conditional on 
the level of income. We argue that this outcome reflects network and long-run transition 
effects. 
Religious people might be happier if they live in a religious society. By the same 
token, atheistic people might be happier if they live in a society in which religion does not 
play an important role. Both groups might be less happy in countries with medium levels of 
religiosity, due to the rivalry between the networks if no common identity is formed. The 
long-run religious transition could be another reason for the estimated non-linearity between 
happiness and religiosity. People might be unhappier and less secure on average during the 
transition from a traditional to a modern society, which triggers changes in many economic, 
political, and cultural variables, not only with regard to religiosity. 
Taken at face value, our empirical results imply a hump-shaped indifference curve, 
given that happiness can be considered as a proxy of utility and religiosity as an input of the 
utility function. Further research should reveal whether persistent changes in the relative price 
of religiosity in the course of economic development can help explain the transition from a 
traditional to a modern level of religiosity that may follow from our hump-shaped indifference 
curves. 
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Appendix 
Table A1.  Definitions and sources of variables 
Dependent variable 
happiness  Measure of average national happiness, generated by ordered probit regression with country fixed 
effects from individual answers to the World Values Survey question: "Taking all things together, 
would you say you are: very happy; quite happy; not very happy; not at all happy?" 
Sources: Own calculations based on Stevenson and Wolfers (2008) and WVS data for 1982, 1990, 
1995, 2000, and 2005. 
Explanatory variables (alphabetical order) 
civil liberties  Index of civil liberties, here rescaled so that a higher value corresponds to a higher level of civil 
liberties. 
Source: Freedom House (2010). 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=439 
democracy  Measures the degree of democracy. The index is constructed to range from -10 for total autocracies 
to +10 for total democracies. 
Source: Gurr et al. (2010). 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm 
gastil  Arithmetic average of civil liberties and political rights. 
Source: Freedom House (2010). 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=439 
life expectancy  Years of life expectancy at birth. 
Source: World Bank (2010). http://data.worldbank.org/indicator 
ln gdpc  Natural logarithm of GDP per capita, measured in 1990 international Geary-Khamis dollars. 
Sources: Maddison (2010), CIA (2011). 
http://www.ggdc.net/MADDISON/oriindex.htm 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ 
ln inflation  Natural logarithm of the rate of inflation. 
Source: World Bank (2010). 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator 
marriage rate  The marriage rate counts the number of marriages per 100,000 inhabitants in each country. In the 
cases of India, Pakistan, Morocco, and Nigeria, the marriage rates were calculated by relying on 
changes in the number of totally married people. Omitting these countries does not affect the validity 
of the reported results. 
Sources: United Nations Statistical Yearbook (various issues)., United Nations (UN) Statistics 
Division. Demographic and Social Statistics, Euromonitor International (2009). World Consumer 
Lifestyles Databook. Euromonitor Pub. 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/syb/ 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/default.htm 
misery  Arithmetic average of unemployment rate and inflation. 
political rights  Index of political rights, here rescaled so that a higher value corresponds to a higher level of political 
rights. 
Source: Freedom House (2010). http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=439 
religiosity  Index of the intensity of religion, compiled from 14 items of the WVS. 
Source: Paldam and Gundlach (2010). 
stability  Joint measure of civil liberties and ln inflation, here estimated by first principal components. 
unemployment  Unemployment rate. 
Sources: World Bank (2010), UN Statistics Division. 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator, http://unstats.un.org/unsd/syb/ 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/default.htm 
Alternative dependent variable 
life satisfaction  Measure of average national life satisfaction, generated by ordered probit regression with country 
fixed effects from individual answers to the World Values Survey question: "All things considered, 
how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?" 
Source: Own calculations based on Stevenson and Wolfers (2008) and WVS data for 1982, 1990, 
1995, 2000, and 2005. 
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Table A2.  Estimates for religiosity and life satisfaction 
 Dependent  variable:  life satisfaction 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
religiosity  -1.45 -1.01*  -0.66 -1.09 -0.34 
  (0.82)  (0.52) (0.66) (0.58) (0.63) 
_ religiosity squared   2.23* 1.49* 0.65 1.50* 0.97 
  (0.74)  (0.50) (0.69) (0.57) (0.58) 
ln gdpc  0.44* 0.36* 0.10 0.30*  0.38* 
  (0.03)  (0.04) (0.09) (0.05) (0.04) 
participation  - -  0.03  0.04*  - 
     (0.02)  (0.02)  
misery  -  - -0.06  -0.05 - 
     (0.03)  (0.03)  
slope dummy china  -  - - -  -1.11 
         (0.72) 
level dummy china  -  - - -  0.72 
         (0.38) 
Estimator  OLS RE FE RE RE 
Number of obs.   234  234  194  194  234 
Number of countries  93  93  82  82  93 
R2  adjusted  0.48  - - - - 
R2  overall  -  0.47 0.46 0.51 0.50 
R2  between  -  0.51 0.52 0.55 0.53 
R2  within  -  0.08 0.12 0.10 0.08 
F-test fixed eff. (p-val.) -  -  8.49  (0.00)  -  - 
Hausmann test, p-value  -  0.08 - 0.04 - 
   Hausman test defined  -  no    no   
FE/BE-coeff. test, p-val.        
   religiosity  -  0.73 - 0.69 - 
    _ religiosity squared   -  0.69 - 0.41 - 
   ln gdpc  -  0.03 - 0.05 - 
   participation  - -  -  0.63  - 
   misery  - -  -  0.29  - 
   Joint coefficient  equal.  -  0.05 - 0.04 - 
        
Note: The columns refer to results achieved with alternative estimation methods: ordinary least squares (OLS), 
country-fixed effects estimates (FE), and random effects estimates (RE). Standard errors in parentheses; robust 
standard errors for OLS. *denotes statistical significance at the 5 percent level. For an explanation of the tests, 
see text. 
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Table 1.  Benchmark estimates for religiosity and happiness 
 Dependent  variable:  happiness 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
religiosity  0.95* -2.07* -1.46 -1.19*  -1.42* 
  (0.19)  (0.68) (1.05) (0.58) (0.52) 
_ religiosity squared   -  2.94* 2.41* 1.50* 2.11* 
    (0.64) (0.95) (0.61) (0.48) 
ln gdpc  0.31*  0.35* 0.30* 0.35* 0.30* 
  (0.04)  (0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.04) 
Estimator  OLS  OLS  BE FE RE 
Number of obs.   234  234  93  234  234 
Number of countries  93  93  93  93  93 
R2  adjusted  0.29  0.36  - - - 
R2 overall  -  -  0.36  0.28  0.36 
R2 between  -  -  0.37  0.25  0.36 
R2 within  -  -  0.09  0.15  0.12 
Hansen threshold test           
   LM (p-value) 27.7  (0.00)  - - - - 
   Threshold value  0.54  -  -  -  - 
   95% confidence set  [0.48, 0.60]  -  -  -  - 
F-test fixed eff. (p-val.) -  -  -  9.04  (0.00)   
Hausmann test (p-val.)  -  - - -  6.93  (0.14) 
   Hausman test defined          no 
FE/BE-coeff. test (p-val)        
   religiosity  -  - - -  0.10  (0.75) 
    _ religiosity squared   -  - - -  0.80  (0.37) 
   ln gdpc  -  - - -  0.17  (0.68) 
   Joint coefficient equal.  -  - - -  6.95  (0.07) 
        
Note: The columns refer to results achieved with alternative estimation methods: ordinary least squares (OLS), 
between estimates (BE), country-fixed effects estimates (FE), and random effects estimates (RE). Standard 
errors in parentheses; robust standard errors for OLS. *denotes statistical significance at the 5 percent level. For 
an explanation of the tests, see text. 
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Table 2.  Random-effects estimates for religiosity and happiness with control variables 
  Dependent variable: happiness 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
religiosity  -1.74* -1.70* -1.65* -1.67* -1.43* -1.44* -1.33* 
  (0.52) (0.52) (0.53) (0.51) (0.52) (0.54) (0.51) 
religiosity_squared  2.37* 2.31* 2.28* 2.33* 2.11* 2.12* 2.01* 
  (0.50) (0.50) (0.52) (0.50) (0.50) (0.52) (0.50) 
ln gdpc  0.26*    0.27* 0.28* 0.32* 0.33* 0.25* 0.33* 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) 
civil liberties  0.04*  - - - - - - 
  ( 0 . 0 2 )         
political rights  -  0.03*  - - - - - 
    ( 0 . 0 1 )        
democracy  - -  0.07  - - - - 
     ( 0 . 0 5 )       
marriage rate  - - -  -0.04*  - - - 
       (0.01)      
life expectancy  - - - -  -0.39  - - 
       ( 0 . 6 5 )     
ln inflation  - - - - -  -0.05*  - 
        ( 0 . 0 1 )    
unemployment  - - - - - -  -0.04 
         ( 0 . 3 7 )  
Number  of  obs.    230 230 220 208 231 212 218 
Number  of  countries  91 91 86 83 91 91 86 
R2  overall  0.38 0.37 0.34 0.41 0.36 0.40 0.39 
R2  between  0.38 0.36 0.34 0.39 0.36 0.39 0.39 
R2  within  0.14 0.16 0.12 0.16 0.12 0.18 0.13 
Hausman test, p-value  0.22 0.14 0.10 0.34 0.14 0.18 0.00 
   Hausman test defined  no  no  no  no  no  no  no 
FE/BE-coeff. test, p- v a l s .          
   religiosity  0.33 0.83 0.20 0.57 0.83 0.54 0.70 
   religiosity_squared  0.14 0.16 0.07 0.24 0.46 0.97 0.78 
   ln gdpc  0.60 0.62 1.00 0.66 0.74 0.95 0.66 
   control variable  0.49  0.76  0.59  0.96  0.29  0.16  0.00 
   Joint coefficient equality  0.13  0.08  0.04  0.22  0.08  0.13  0.00 
         
Note: All results estimated with a random effects (RE) model. Standard errors in parentheses. *denotes statistical 
significance at the 5 percent level. For an explanation of the tests, see text. 
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Table 3.  Robustness tests for religiosity and happiness 
 Dependent  variable:  happiness 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
religiosity  -1.75*  -1.67*  -1.81* -1.68  -1.09 -1.44* 
  (0.52) (0.59) (0.45) (0.99) (0.62) (0.52) 
religiosity_squared  2.31*  1.87*  2.16* 2.02 1.85*  2.13* 
  (0.51) (0.61) (0.48) (1.14) (0.57) (0.50) 
ln gdpc  0.23* 0.21* 0.14* 0.40* 0.31* 0.30* 
  (0.05) (0.09) (0.03) (0.16) (0.04) (0.04) 
participation  0.04*  0.05*  - - - - 
  (0.02)  (0.02)      
misery  -0.09*  -0.08*  - - - - 
  (0.03)  (0.03)      
lagged happiness  - -  0.70*  0.06  - - 
     (0.05)  (0.14)    
slope dummy china  - - - -  -0.61  - 
       (0.72)   
slope dummy usa  - - - - -  -0.38 
        (0.98) 
level dummy  - - - -  0.30  0.14 
       (0.39)  (0.57) 
Estimator RE  FE  OLS  FE  RE  RE 
Number  of  obs.    194 194 125 125 234 234 
Number  of  countries  82 82 60 60 93 93 
R2  adjusted  -  - 0.80 -  -  - 
R2  overall  0.43 0.38  -  0.40 0.37 0.36 
R2  between  0.41 0.33  -  0.44 0.36 0.36 
R2  within  0.27 0.28  -  0.14 0.12 0.12 
F-test fixed eff., p-value  - 0.00 - 0.09 -  - 
Hausmann test, p-value  0.35  - - - - - 
   Hausman test defined  no           
FE/BE-coeff. test, p- v a l .         
   religiosity  0.99  - - - - - 
    _ religiosity squared   0.66  - - - - - 
   ln gdpc  0.57  - - - - - 
   participation  0.34  - - - - - 
   misery  0.27  - - - - - 
   Joint coefficient  equal.  0.26  - - - - - 
        
Note: Random effects (RE), country-fixed effects (FE), and ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation. Standard 
errors in parentheses¸; robust standard errors for OLS. *denotes statistical significance at the 5 percent level. For 
an explanation of the tests, see text.   23
Figure 1.  Religiosity as a consumption good with hump-shaped indifference curves 
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